Le Sabot Post-Moderne

I will agree and disagree with you here. Man's saving virtue here is his rational nature; his reason tells him that it is better to enjoy the world's pleasures in moderation, to treat people as he would like to be treated, to trade with them fairly instead of steal, etc. These virtues are univerals that flow from man's nature, discoverable independent of one's faith in a higher power.

(Note that I don't regard religion as immaterial to virtue. Belief in a higher power can *augment* rational ethics, and deliver a set of injunctions above and beyond mortal ethics that give a man a calling beyond the material.)

Kids are not inherently selfish - they're simply blank slates. What society provides to kids is a shortcut to the direct application of reason. Just as a child can rely on mentors to teach him what geometry is so that he does not have to repeat the past 10,000 years of mathematical discovery, he can rely on his parents to teach him right from wrong so he does not have to re-enact thousands of years of philosophical thought.

What's interesting in the Rousseauist approach is that reason is not treated as an aspect of man's nature. Anything that comes from reason - science, higher philosophical learning - is deemed a "corruption". In this view, the best man is nothing more than a wild beast.

And yes, I know you and I will disagree sharply on the role of religion. I have my pointy stick at the ready. :)

Hmm,

you've induced me to jump in, Zero Boss. If there is a "rational ethics", in the sense of one equally available to all rational people (whatever they might be), why is there such an enormous ethical variation, not just among cultures, but within the same culture over time, or even among a group as narrow as contemporary america atheists?

Are you at all familiar with Alasdair MacIntyre's work on the subject (After Virtue being primarily in my mind)? The idea that there is a way to work ethics completely without recourse to God has been very seriously questioned by him. If you haven't yet, I encourage you to check it out.

I guess I could spell this out a little better instead of being cryptic. MacIntyre's assertion is that there is no "reason" which is tradition independent. It is not possible to be a human being without a history, nor is it possible to develop a sense of ethics (or epistomolgy or any other line of thought) apart from some sort of society. He goes on to question whether we, as western/liberals have inherited a set of ethics which belongs to a story/history (and by this he means Christianity) which is no longer shared. That is, do our common ethical presumptions, eg against stealing, only make sense as part of the Christian narrative?

He explores this fairly thoroughly and I won't be foolish enough to try to duplicate his run through the history if philosophy.

I haven't, Paul, but I will do so when I have the chance.

As for ethical variation, the existence of variation doesn't discount the existence of a rational ethics, as there can always be another explanation for that. It sounds like the argument for Intelligent Design: we can't find any other cause, so we'll posit a controlling intelligence. If mankind resolved all of its tough questions this way, we'd be in trouble. :)

I believe that humans are born depraved because the Bible teaches it. But I'm curious to know, Zero Boss, how your system accounts for all the unreasonable things humans do? Is it because that reason they have isn't cultivated?
When I saw your comment it blew me away because I didn't think people believed what you do!

ZB,

I'm not sure if I like the analogy with Intelligent Design (not that I have anything against ID), but then again, my argument about ethical variation was off the top of my head, so feel free to jump on that however you wish. It does seem that if one were to posit that ethics can or ought to be derived (solely) rationally, AND one believes that rationality is universal in some sense, that the problem of ethical variation represents a problem in need of answering.

If you take the approach that most existing ethics are not rational in some sense (and this is undoubtedly the case as far as I'm concerned), then it seems that either a) rationality is not universal or b) rationality is not universally seen as necessary to ethics.

FWIW the best Christian approach I've seen to this question is in the works of Stanley Hauerwas, beginning in A Community of Character. Hauerwas built quite a bit on the thought of MacIntyre.

Joel - quite simply, people can convince themselves of the "reasonableness" of any number of ideas. And people can choose to be unreasonable or deceitful.

That doesn't mean that reason is unsound, just that human nature is complex. It does mean, of course, that we must constantly questions our own assumptions.

Paul - your argument is a slippery slope. There was a time when science wasn't universal. It still isn't regarded as such in some corners of the world. Even in the West, leftist academics blather about "white male physics", and claim that our sciences are a form of oppression. Does that mean physics is not universal?

Just for the record, I'm not a Christian (if that wasn't obvious :). I'm just someone who admires DS's writing, and who loves how he asks questions and makes statements that force me to question my own beliefs. My own philosphical bent is Goddess Paganism in the framework of Ken Wilber's Integral spirituality.

ZB!

I'm really, really glad to have you here, man. :-) I have a couple of responses to your points, but I want to wait til after I've slept to post them. See you soon.

(1) To paraphrase Voltaire, if restraint and civilzation were destroyed tomorrow, it would be i man's best interest to rebuild it as quickly as possible. A child, or anybody, in "nature" is not going to be some free soul frolicking in the fields. He will be someone working as hard as hell to survive, with no guarantees of success. Even the most beautiful tropical paradise will be prone to catacylisms and unknown dangers: disease, predators, natural disasters, etc.. All his mental and physical energy would go into that task. He would, very quickly, become very disciplined, or die.

(2) Your complaint of "selfishness" doesn't tell the whole story. Although "selfish," children are highly dependent on other people, and will stay dependent through advancing years if they don't mature properly. A "selfish" child will not act in his best interest by become independent of other people's whims and circumstances. Solipsism would be the better word--a child expects all people, property, facts, phenomena, and institutions to conform to their own appetites. A child matures to the degree which he comes to terms with reality, be it of the natural world or of the proper expectations he can have of those around him.

I've had this fight before, but it bears repeating: selfishness is not a bad thing in itself. Wanting to improve your situation, wanting to be independent and self-sufficient, wanting to leave others alone when their own interests aren't at stake, is a virtue and not a vice. If a child is going to survive in "nature", or anywhere else with some respectability, he'd better be selfish. As for agape love, by definition, such a sentiment is impossible for someone unless it is some he wants to do. Before you can say "I love you," you must first be able to say "I".

Protagonist - excellent point, and very well said.

DS - I'd love to hear your points. But I understand if you're busy. There was some sort of inauguration in your part of the Earth today, wasn't there?

Evolution adequately explains the existence of ethics and morality--a culture that develops patterns of mutually supportive behavior will be "fitter" and more likely to survive and thrive than a (hypothetical) one that does not. Ethics as a product of reason is a red herring. I'm not familiar with MacIntyre, but from Paul's brief mention it sounds to me like he's barking up the wrong tree.